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IN 'THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LORENZO C~. F()RSEY, ·'l 
,.._... 
II, 
\ 
Plaintiff -Respondent, 
\ 0 
····--· ------------.-----··-:i"'"~ 
-------·· _ _ c ~ u •· \Jt_.., 
-vs.-
--- -·---.. :· 
~ ---" ' 
E. GIRARD HALE, as Executor of 
the Will and Estate of Mabel Bean 
Forsey, Deceased, 
Defendant-eL4 ppellant 
'• $~prt~;.f•·" - "' ••• 
Case No. 9585 
RESPONDl~~'T•S BRIEF 
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619 Continental Bank Bldg. 
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Attorneys for Appellant 
l{()~INEY & XELSON 
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Salt Lake City 1, Utah 
... 4ttnrnf.lf.~;,· for Respondent 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LORl~XZ() C~. FORSEY, 
Pla;in.tiff -Respondent, 
-vs.-
E. U IRARD .HALE, as Executor of 
the vVill and Estate of ~f abel Bean 
Forsey~ Deceased, 
Defendant-Appellant 
Case No. 9585 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FA·CT,S 
Respondent agrees ",.ith the statement of facts set 
forth in Appellant's Brief, except as follo,vs: 
From the record it is not clear 'vhether the amounts 
paid by Lincoln National Life Insurance Company we.re 
reimbursed to the Respondent, or paid direct to the hospi-
tal and doctors, nor is it clear ",.hether such amount~ ",.ere 
paid before or after the death of decedent. ( R. 10) 
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2 
The payn1ents made by Lincoln National Life Insur-
ance Co1npany 'vere made pursuant to the terms of a 
group insurance policy issued to the Plaintiff as an 
employee of Forsey Furniture Co1npany, under a master 
policy issued to Utah Furniture Association. l\1:abel H. 
Forsey (who is the same person as ~fabel Bean Forsey, 
Deceased) was designated in the policy as the dependent 
spouse of Lorenzo C. Forsey. (Exhibit-R. 34) 
The a1nount in dispute is the sum of $1,205.41, to-
gether with interest from the time of payment. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
·THE DEFENDANT IS OBLIGATED BY STATUTE TO 
PAY FUNERAL EXPENSES AND EXPENSES OF LAST 
SICKNESS. 
Section 75-9-21, Utah Code Annotated 1953, provides 
as follows: 
''The Executor or Administrator, as soon as 
he has sufficient funds in his hands, 1nust pay the 
funeral expenses and expenses of last sickness *** 
of the decedent.'' ( E1nphasis added.) 
This Section and Section 7 4-4-6, Section 75-8-1 and 
Section 75-8-2, lTtah Code Annotated 1953, must be con-
strued together. In re J.l!ou·er's Estate, 93 lTt.ah 390, 
73 Pac. 2nd 967. Thus the pay1nent of last siclrness and 
funeral expenses are 1nade a n1andat.ory charge against 
the estate, ahead of the homestead exemption (See in re 
ltfower's Estate; also in re. Peterson's Estate 69 l"""tah 
' 484, 256 Pac. 409), and ahead of the family allo,vanee as 
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~pPrifirally statPd in Hcetion 7:-l-8-1, lTtah Code Annotated 
1 ~r):~. and ahead of summary distribution, as stated in 
SP<'tion 7:-l-~-~, l Ttah Code AnnotatPd, 1953. Further-
tnore, this Honorable Court in the case of in re. II ansc n' s 
B):)fate, 55 lrtah ~3_, 184 Par.197, has held that claims for 
funeral Pxpensrs and expenses of lact sickness are not 
required to be presented as other clai1ns, but tnay be paid 
by the Administrator "Tithout having been presented and 
allo\\·Pd. Furthermore, in the case of Dunn r. lralli ng-
f'o rd, 47 1~ tah 491, 155 Pac. 3-!7, this Court has held that 
'vhen funeral expenses are paid by a third person, and 
not by a personal representative, they become a legal 
charge against the estate as the la'v implies a promise 
to reimburse. 
Therefore, by statute, there is a mandatory prior 
~tatutory obligation upon the executor to pay the funeral 
expenses and expenses of last sickness of the decedent 
to 'vhoever is entitled to such payment. 
POINT II. 
THE RESPONDENT IS THE ONE ENTITLED 'TO SUCH 
PAYMENT. 
In all three points of the argument in Appellant's 
Brief, .A .. ppellant contends in substance that the Respond-
ent did not pay the said last sickness expenses, but that 
the san1e "·ere paid by the insurance company, and there-
fore, that the respondent is not entitled to reimbursement 
from the executor. This contention is based upon a 
pre1nise '"hich is \vholly and con1pletely false. On Page 
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6 of Appellant's Brief, Appellant quotes fro In a letter 
of transmittal on the inside of the policy (R. 34) as fol-
lows" 
"*** We urge you to sho\\" appreciation of the 
fact that your employer is paying a substantial 
portion of your premium." 
'"rhis state1nent is no evidence of the fact that the pre-
mium was not paid by the Respondent, but if anything 
is positive evidence of that which is a fact, namely, that 
the premium for this policy was in fact paid by the Re-
spondent as an employee of Forsey Furniture Company, 
at least partially in cash and partially as a fringe benefit 
of his employment. 
Now here in the record is there any claim that the 
decedent, Mabel Bean Forsey, paid any part of the pre-
mium of this policy. Lorenzo ( 1• Forsey was the insured 
employee, and as such he designated l\label Forsey as his 
dependent, and in his forethought provided for the pay-
ment of expenses of illness in her behalf. Thus, these 
expenses of last illness were paid by the insurance com-
pany to Lorenzo C. Forsey, as the insured, or for his 
account to the doctors and hospital, pursuant to a con-
tractual relationship bet,veen the said insurance company 
and the said Lorenzo C. Forsey·, the premium for ""hich 
insurance "~as paid by Lorenzo C. Fo.rsey either in "~hole 
or in part, directly, and possibly in part by his en1ployer 
as one of the considerations of his ernployn1ent. 
Who then is entitled to the reilnbursement for the~P 
expenses of last sickness'? The Appellant does not and 
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ean not eon tend that he, as executor of the estate of :Jlabel 
I~Pan Forse~ .. , i~ entitled to such payn1ent for there is no 
elai1n that ~label Bean F~or~PY ever paid any part of these 
preinituns. SurPly the I~incoln K ational Life lnsuranee 
Cotnpany is not entitled to such reimburse1nent, for they 
\\·Pre under contractual obligation to pay the said ex-
pt?n~es in consideration of the premiums \Yhich had been 
paid to the1n hy Lorenzo ·C. Forse~,., or for his account. 
Lorenzo ( 1 • Forsey, the insured, paid these last illness 
expenses as surely as if he had taken the money out of his 
O\Vll pocket, and this is so even though he was reimbursed 
therefor by the insurance company pursuant to their con-
tractual obligation. 
It is the general rule that compensation or indemnity 
received by a claimant from a collateral source, \\·holly 
independent of the \\'Tongdoer cannot be set up by the 
latter in mitigation or reduction of drunages. 25 C.J .S. 
Da1nages, §99, 15 .A .. m. ,Jur. Damages, §198, 201. See An-
notation in 13 A.I ... R. 2d 355. Thus in a leading case, 
.A .. nheuser-Busch, Inc. r. Starley. 28 Cal. 2d 362, 170 P.2d 
448, 166 A.L.R. 198, an action by an O"\\rner of goods par-
tially destroyed "·hile in the possession of a common car-
rier by the· negligent act of the defendant, even though 
the o\\·ner had been paid the an1ount of his loss by the 
carrier in the discharge of its statutory liability, the court 
~tated the rule to be as follows 
H,\ ... here a person suffers personal injury or 
property damage by reason of the wrongful act 
of another, an action against the \\·rongdoer for 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
the da1nages suffered i~ not precluded nor is 
the amount of the damages reduced by the receipt 
by him of payment for his loss from a source 
'vholly independent of the 'vrongdoer. '' 
And in Swift & Con1pa ny ·r. Gutierez, 76 Ida. 82, 277 P. 
2d 559, it was held that, to make the defense of payment 
available as a bar to a tort action, it 1nust be plead and 
proved that payn1ent to the plaintiff """as made by the 
defendant or from a source connected with the defendant 
and to which the defendant had contributed. 
It has also been held that the above rule applies even 
though the defendant was not guilty of any \\'Tongdoing or 
negligence if the law has made him liable for the injury 
in their absence. Regan v. New York & N.E .R. Co., 60 
Conn. 124, 22 A. 503, 25 Am. St. Rep. 306. In that case 
a statute made railroad companies liable for destruction 
of property by fire communicated from locomotives re-
gardless of negligence, and the court, in an exhaustive 
study of the cases in the English and American courts, 
held that the authorities were in absolute accord that the 
defendant is not entitled to a reduction of damages to 
the extent of insurance on the property paid by an insur-
ance comp,any to the plaintiff. The English cases cited 
in the opinion involved statutes "Thich n1ade communities 
responsible to inhabitants for dan1age to their property 
caused' by robbery, riot and other violent crilnes. The 
liability therein 'vas p·redicated upon the obligation cre-
ated by statute and not upon negligence, being similar 
in that respect to the Regan cast). This is precisely the 
situation in the instant case and our o'vn Supreme Court 
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ha~ ~poken eloquently· upon the subject in ruling that the 
rPePipt of $~)()() by an en1ployee for n1edical treatment 
fro1n his O\Yn accident insurer 'vould not relieve his em-
plo~·er of his statutory obligation to pay the same sun1 
under the \Y. orlonen's Compensation Act. Anderson u. 
Industrial Con1nziss£ou, 108 lT. 52, 157 P.2d 253. The hold-
ing of the court in that case was as follo,vs : 
H*** \\~ e are asked, in effect, to hold that it 
( e1nployee 's private insurer) paid the sun1 for 
the benefit of the employer rather than for the 
benefit of the insured in order to prevent the un-
just enrichment of the latter. But 'vould not such 
holding, in effect, unjustly enrich appellant 'f U n-
der the p·rovisions of Sec. 42-1-43 the employee 
'vho has suffered a compensable accident is 'en-
titled to receive, and shall be paid' such amount 
'for medical, nurse and hospital services' as pro-
vided by Sec. -1:2-1-75, U.C.A. 1943. The sum here 
involved w·as for services rendered because of the 
accident arising out of and in the course of Milne's 
employment. Hence, if the total is reasonable, it 
is one 'vhich the statute says appellant should pay 
and Milne is entitled to receive. 
''The plaintiff app·arently concedes that had 
1\Iilne paid the amount involved assuming that the 
total "'"as reasonable, appellant, under the statutes, 
",.ould be required to reimburse him. B~~tt as we 
vieu· the Jnatter, Milne did, as between him and 
plain tiff, pay it. He paid the pre1ni1~;ms, he p1vr-
chased the benefits. ilfilne hence procured the 
su1n to be paid u·hich the plaintiff was obligated 
to pay. As betzceen plaintiff and hinz it was his 
payn~ent. Clearly it u·as not paynzent by pla,intiff. '' 
(Emphasis added.) 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
The above authorities are in unanimous agreement 
that to hold otherwise would allo"'" the ''"'rongdoer to 
pay nothing, and yet take all the benefit of a policy of 
insurance without paying the premium, \vithoutany priv-
ity between him and the insurance company and without 
the policy having been obtained for his benefit or upon 
his request. Thus, in Campbell r. Sutliff, 193 \Vis. 370, 
214 N.W. 374, 53 A.L.R. 771, the court stated: 
"The sums paid for such insurance are in the 
nature of an investment, which like other invest-
ments made by the plaintiff, ought not to inure to 
the benefit of the defendant. The only parties 
interested in such a contract of insurance are the 
plaintiff and the insurer." 
And the United States Supreme Court stated as follo"?s 
in Phoenix Ins. Co. v. The Atlas, 93 l~.s. 302, 23 L.Ed. 
863: 
"What the plaintiff recovers under his policy 
of insurance is not compensation for damages, but 
payment under a contract independent of the claim 
against the ''rrongdoer.'' 
In the case of In re. Randle's Estate, 20 X\\'" 2nd 464, 
465 cited by the Appellant, the Io,va Court denied reinl-
bursement to the \Yidow on the grounds that the 1noney 
was--not paid by her, but by the lTnited ::\line Workers of 
America Local lTnion, the said n1oney having been raised 
by an assessment of $1.00 per n1ember of the lTnion for 
the purpose of applying on the pay1nent of funeral ex-
penses. This case can be differentiated fron1 the case at 
bar. In the Randle ·Case, there 'vas no contractual rela-
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tionsh i p het"·epn the \\"idow and the Union, but the pay-
1nent hy the Union \\"a8 a voluntary payment which 1night 
entitle thetn to rein1hursement fro1n the estate had the 
lTnion 1nade such demand upon the Executor. 
The case of Snzith r. E'ichncr, (''Tash.), 215 Pac. 27, 
cited hy ... t\.ppellant, does not sustain their position, but 
holds affirmatively that expenses of last sickness and 
funeral charges are chargeable against the state, not by 
reason of a contract express or implied, but hy virtue 
of the statute. 
POINT III. 
THE DENIAL OF RESPONDENT'S CLAIM WOULD CON-
STITUTE UNJUST ENRICHMENT TO THE APPELLANT . 
... \.ppellant cites the case of Straube v. Bou1ing Gt·eeu 
{ias Co., 18 A.L.R. 2nd 1335 as authority for his conten-
tion that the Appellant would not be unjustly enriched 
if he failed to pay the expenses of last sickness. 
A careful reading of the Straube case reveals that 
it is not in point, but can be differentiated fully. In the 
Straube case the Court quotes from the case of Hum,mel 
v. Hununel, 133 Ohio St. 520, 14 NE 2nd 923, 927 as fol-
lo,vs: 
'~ l~njust enrichn1ent of a person occurs when 
he has and retains Inoney or benefits 'Yhich in jus-
tice and equity belong to another." 
... lppellant also quotes this extract from the Hu nunel 
Case on Page -± of his brief in support of his contention 
that the doctrine of unjust enrichn1ent does not apply. 
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We concur in the statement quoted by the Court in 
the Hummel ·Case and contend that this statement sus-
tains our position. 
The appellant here has and retains 1noney \Yhich 
in justice and equity belongs to another. The Utah Stat-
ute places upon the Appellant, as executor, a mandatory 
obligation to pay the last sickness expenses of the de-
cedent ahead of other claims, and even \vithout the neces-
sity of the filing of a claim. If the appellant fails to make 
such payment, unquestionably he is enriched. If that 
1noney in justice and equity should be paid to another, 
and it is not so paid, then the Appellant is enriched un-
justly. The Respondent, \vith proper foresight, obtained 
and contracted for a group insurance policy to cover his 
own illnesses and accidents, as \Ve ll as those of his de-
pendent spouse, and named 1\Iabel Forsey as such de-
pendant and beneficiary, and provided for the paJinent 
of the premiums for the said policy. The consideration 
for the policy \vas the premiums \\"hich he paid either 
in full, directly, or perhaps in part, indirectly, as one of 
the conditions of his e1nploy1nent \vith the Forsey Furni-
ture ·C·ompany. ThPreby, the insurance company \vas obli-
gated by contract \Vith Forsey to pay illness expenses, 
and Lorenzo C. Forsey, the Respondent, is the only per-
son entitled to reimbursernent fron1 the executor. 
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l 10NCLlTSION 
J.1.,ron1 thP forPgoing, 've conclude as follo,vs: 
1. rrhe Statute fixes upon Executors and Admini~­
trators a 1nandator~· rharge to pay expenses of last sick-
nP~s to the one Pntitled to such pay1nent, and to pay the 
~atne ahead of otheT claims, and even 'vi thout thP- neces-
sity of a c.laim being filed therefor. 
:!. The one entitled to such payment is the Respond-
ent, and not the Insurance Company, nor the Appellant; 
the Insurance Co1npany having made reimbursement to 
Re~pondent nndPr the rontractual liability to the Re-
~pondent, for W'hich Respondent paid a consideration. 
3. If appellant failed to pay said last sickness ex-
penses to Respondent, the Appelant thereby 'vould be 
unjustly enriched at the expense of Resp,ondent. 
4-. All three points of Appellant's brief are based 
upon the premise that, becau8e the Insurance Company 
reimbursed Respondent for said last sickness expenses, 
said expenses "·ere not paid by Respondent. This premise 
i~ "'"holly false, as the evidence is clear and undisp,uted 
that Respondent did pay a consideration for said insur-
ance, and therefore he, and no one else is entitled to pay-
Inent. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RO~lNEY & NELSOX 
-!04 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, TJtah 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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